Why are business cycles alike across exchange-rate regimes? by Luca Dedola & Sylvain Leduc
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
Ten Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574• (215) 574-6428• www.phil.frb.org
WORKING PAPERS
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
WORKING PAPER NO. 02-11





Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
April 2002Working Paper No. 02-11
Why Are Business Cycles Alike Across Exchange-Rate Regimes?
1
         Luca Dedola
2 and Sylvain Leduc
3
April 2002
                                                          
1 We thank an anonymous referee, Rui Albuquerque, Giancarlo Corsetti, Michael Devereux, Martin
Eichenbaum, Peter Ireland, Urban Jermann, Per Krusell, Tommaso Monacelli, Kevin Moran, Pierre Sarte,
Alan Stockman, and Jeff Wrase for many helpful comments, as well as seminar participants at the Bank of
Italy, Boston College, the Chicago Fed 1999 Workshop in International Finance, the 1999 EEA and SED
Meetings, the 2000 Econometric Society World Meeting, George Washington University, and Wharton. All
remaining errors are our own. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent those of the Bank of Italy, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, or the Federal Reserve
System.
2 Banca D’Italia
3 Federal Reserve Bank of PhiladelphiaABSTRACT
Since the adoption of flexible exchange rates in the early 1970s, real exchange rates have been
much more volatile than they were under Bretton Woods. However, the literature showed that the
volatilities of most other macroeconomic variables have not been affected by the change in
exchange-rate regime. This poses a puzzle for standard international business cycle models. In
this paper, we study this puzzle by developing a two-country, two-sector model with nominal
rigidities featuring deviations from the law of one price because a fraction of firms set prices in
buyers' currencies. We show that a model with such building blocks can improve the match
between the model and the data across exchange-rate regimes. By partially insulating goods
markets across countries and thus mitigating the international expenditure-switching effect, local
currency pricing considerably dampens the responses of net exports to shocks hitting the
economies therefore helping to account for the puzzle.
JEL classification: E32, E52, F31, F33, F41.
Keywords: equilibrium business cycle, price-adjustment costs, exchange-rate regime, exchange
rate volatility.1. Introduction
It is a well-established fact in international ﬁnance that the exchange-rate regime
has non-neutral eﬀects, since it aﬀects the behavior of the real exchange rate. For
instance, real exchange rates have been much more variable under the current
managed ﬂoat than they were under the Bretton Woods system.1 There is also
overwhelming evidence that, since 1973, large swings in nominal and real exchange
rates have been closely correlated while ratios of price indices have been fairly
stable. Many economists view this as evidence that price rigidities matter and
that they should be one of the basic ingredients in any theory of international
economic ﬂuctuations.
However, a second, more puzzling set of stylized facts was pointed out by Bax-
ter and Stockman (1989). For a range of countries, they show that the statistical
properties of most other macroeconomic variables under the current managed ﬂoat
have remained very similar to what they were under Bretton Woods.2 This evi-
dence poses a serious challenge to any open-economy business cycle model, with
or without nominal rigidities, in which relative prices (such as the real exchange
rate) play a critical role in the allocation of real quantities. In these models, one
would ap r i o r iexpect a change in the volatility of the real exchange rate to be
associated with a change in that of other macroeconomic series. For instance, in
a typical two-country business cycle model in which each country is specialized
in the production of one good, Backus et al. (1995) showed that the terms of
trade are equal to the marginal rate of substitution between these two goods. As
a result, movements in the terms of trade are linked to movements in the im-
port ratio, namely the ratio of imports to output minus exports. Therefore, more
volatile relative prices will be associated with, at least, more volatile quantities.3
They concluded that “the issue is how to account for the sharp increase in price
variability without generating a similar increase in the variability of quantities.”
1Stockman (1983) and Mussa (1986), among others, documented those non-neutral eﬀects of
exchange-rate regimes.
2Flood and Rose (1995) showed that the increase in the volatility of the nominal exchange
rate across exchange-rate systems has no statistical counterpart in that of any “traditional”
fundamental suggested by monetary models of the exchange rate. Basu and Taylor (1999) and
Sopraseuth (1999) conﬁrmed these ﬁndings for both the Gold Standard period and the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism.
3Backus et al. (1995) documented that the variability of the terms of trade has been higher
in the post-Bretton Woods period than before by a factor of three, while that of the import
ratio has increased by a much smaller amount (see Table 11.7, page 350).
3The goal of this paper is to quantitatively account for this puzzle by intro-
ducing price rigidity and local currency pricing (LCP)i na no t h e r w i s es t a n d a r d
dynamic general equilibrium model. In studying the impact on equilibrium allo-
cations of some ﬁrms’ ability to price discriminate across countries, we follow a
recent strand in the open-economy literature on ﬂexible exchange-rate regimes. In
a theoretical paper, Betts and Devereux (2000) showed that preset prices in the
buyers’ currency may magnify the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates
for a given pattern of money supply.4 In quantitative contributions, Kollman
(1997), studying a (semi)small open economy, and Chari et al. (2000), in the case
of a two-country world, found that price stickiness in the buyer’s currency can
generate real exchange rates as volatile as in the data under a ﬂoat. Since these
features also lead to an imperfect pass-through of exchange-rate movements to
consumer prices, they can mitigate the eﬀects of exchange-rate changes on equi-
librium allocations, making a model with such building blocks potentially capable
of accounting for the above stylized facts. Moreover, consistent with the growing
empirical evidence, such an environment generates deviations from purchasing
power parity (PPP) that arise from a failure of the law of one price (LOP).5
In particular, we analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange-rate arrangements on
the business cycle properties in a calibrated two-country, two-sector, stochastic
equilibrium model in which some ﬁrms price-to-market and face convex price-
adjustment costs. We examine a two-sector model for two reasons. The ﬁrst
relates to the evidence of a whole range of pricing behavior. By introducing two
sectors with diﬀerent speeds of price-adjustment, we capture this aspect of the
data and view the ﬁndings of our model as quantitatively more convincing.6 The
second reason is that, on one hand, there is some evidence that a great deal of
traded goods are homogeneous. For instance, Rauch (1999) calculated that in
1990 the trade share of homogeneous commodities among 63 countries ranged
from 33 to 35 percent.
The main result of the paper is that the model is able to account for the
empirical fact that more variability in real exchange rates does not get trans-
mitted to other macroeconomic variables. As conjectured, LCP is important to
this ﬁnding. Setting prices in the buyer’s currency increases the volatility of the
4Devereux (1997) provides an excellent survey of the relevant ideas. In the late 1980s, pricing-
to-market (PTM) was extensively studied in the trade literature as a possible explanation for
the subdued response of the U.S. trade deﬁcit to the devaluation of the U.S. dollar. Goldberg
and Knetter (1997) survey the evidence about PTM.
5See e.g., Rogoﬀ (1996) and Engel (1999).
6Wynne (1994) surveys the relevant evidence.
4real exchange rate under a ﬂoat while only marginally aﬀecting the volatility of
quantities across exchange-rate regimes. We show that this is not the case when
ﬁrms do not price-discriminate: for instance, the volatility of net exports increases
dramatically under a ﬂoat relative to a ﬁxed exchange-rate regime. LCP weakens
the expenditure switching eﬀect monetary policy shocks bring about under price
rigidity, since movements in nominal exchange rates are not fully passed through
to international prices. As a result, large variations in exchange rates are not
necessarily associated with large movements in net exports (or other real quanti-
ties). However, one drawback of our model is that it can match the actual real
exchange rate volatility under ﬂexible exchange rates only by making consumption
too volatile.
The decomposition of the variance of the real exchange rate, under each
exchange-rate arrangement, into the variance of relative prices (consumption) in
each country and their covariance also reveals the workings of the model. The
increased volatility of the real exchange rate, when the nominal exchange rate
is allowed to ﬂoat, is mainly due to a fall in the covariance of relative prices
(consumption) across countries. Therefore, since the variability of relative prices
(consumption) is approximately unchanged across exchange-rate regimes, so is the
variability of output and consumption.
Finally, we check the robustness of these results along several important dimen-
sions, including the modeling of monetary policy and changes in the benchmark
calibration. For instance, we show that the presence of two sectors with diﬀerent
pricing behavior is found not to be quantitatively crucial. In addition, assuming
that the money supply follows a forward-looking interest-rate rule, rather than
some exogenous stochastic process, as often assumed in the business cycle litera-
ture, turns out to impinge only on the variability of the real exchange relative to
that of output.
Related papers include Monacelli (1998) and Duarte (2000). In a (semi)small
open economy with Calvo price setting, Monacelli (1998) accounts for the increase
in the variability of the real exchange rate under a managed ﬂoat. Nevertheless,
this attempt is only partially successful; for instance, the volatility of the trade
balance turns out to be aﬀected by the change in the exchange rate regime. Duarte
(2000) studies how incomplete asset markets bear on this issue in a two-country
model with no capital accumulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure
of the model and its workings; in Section 3 we discuss its calibration procedure.
Business cycle statistics for the baseline model are presented in Section 4, while
5sensitivity analysis is conducted in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers concluding
remarks.
2. The Model
Building from the work of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) and Ohanian et al. (1995),
we model a two-country world in which each economy is composed of two sec-
tors: one sector produces a homogeneous good, which we assume to be identical
across countries, while the other sector is specialized in the production of a set
of diﬀerentiated products. Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerentiated goods sector comprises
a continuum of monopolistic ﬁrms, each producing a distinct diﬀerentiated good
using labor and capital. These ﬁrms, contrary to the ﬁrms in the competitive sec-
tor, face convex price-adjustment costs of the type analyzed in Rotemberg (1982).
We assume that, because of barriers to trade, monopolistic ﬁrms are able to price-
discriminate across markets. The homogeneous good, which is perfectly traded
in world markets, is also produced using capital and labor. Capital and labor are
mobile across sectors. For simplicity, we assume that investment is made in the
homogeneous good only. To generate plausible investment volatility, we postulate
a cost to adjusting the amount of capital in a country, as in Baxter and Crucini
(1993). We now describe the model in more detail.
2.1. Preferences
A representative agent inhabits each economy. The agent maximizes his expected
















where CT represents the agent’s consumption of the homogeneous good, H rep-
resents the agent’s supply of labor, M
0 denotes the agent’s demand for nominal
money balances, P is the country’s price index, and CM is an index of consump-
tion of diﬀerentiated home and foreign goods given by
7In the text, a superscript prime variable will denote a time t+1variable, whereas a variable
with no superscript represents a time t variable. Foreign variables will be denoted by an asterisk.



















where c(h) (c(f)) is the agent’s consumption of the home (foreign) brand h (f)o f
the diﬀerentiated good at time t. There is a continuum of these goods, with mea-
sure one. Total consumption is deﬁned according to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator,
C ≡ (CT)γ(CM)1−γ. Preferences and consumption of the foreign representative
agent, C∗, are deﬁn e di nas i m i l a rw a y .
The demand for the brands h and f of the home and foreign diﬀerentiated


























where p(h) (p(f)) is the home currency price of the home-produced (foreign-
produced) brand h (f) of the diﬀerentiated good.



















































Finally, the overall price index is given by P =
(PT)γ(P M)1−γ
γγ (1 − γ)
1−γ .
2.2. Production Technologies
The production of the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods requires combining










, 0 < ρ < 1, (2.7)
7Y (h)=A(K(h))
α (H(h))
1−α , 0 < α < 1,∀h, (2.8)
where A represents an economy-wide, country-speciﬁc random technology shock.8
Capital accumulation is assumed to be carried out in the homogenous good
only. In any given period, K will represent the capital stock in place in the home
country. To have realistic investment ﬂows (investment volatility tends to be too
high otherwise), we follow Baxter and Crucini (1993) and assume that the law of
motion of capital is subject to adjustment costs. The law of motion is described
by the following equation:
K
0 = Ψ(I/K)K +( 1− δ)K (2.9)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Ψ(.) is an increasing, concave, and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable function with two properties entailing no adjustment
costs in steady state: Ψ(δ)=δ and Ψ0(δ)=1 .
2.3. The Firm in the Homogeneous Good Sector

















where P T,R T, and WT denote the nominal price of the purely tradable good,
the rental rate of capital, and the nominal wage rate in the purely tradable good
sector.
2.4. Firms in the Monopolistic Sector
We assume that ﬁrms in the monopolistic sector face a price-adjustment cost.
When the ﬁrm decides to change the price it sets in the home (foreign) country,
it must purchase an amount µ(h)( µ∗(h)) of the homogeneous good. Following
Hairault and Portier (1993), Rotemberg (1996), and Ireland (1997), the adjust-










8We also examined a version of the model with sector-speciﬁc real shocks. The main ﬁndings















Therefore, there are no costs to adjusting prices when the steady state inﬂation
rate π prevails. Because of this cost, a temporary decrease in the growth rate of
the money supply will lead to a gradual fall in the inﬂation rate and to a decrease
of the monopolistic good output below its steady-state value.
This quadratic adjustment cost is not amenable to standard menu cost stories,
emphasizing the ﬁxed cost of price changes. Rotemberg (1982) rationalizes it by
pointing to the adverse eﬀects of price changes on customer-ﬁrm relationships,
which increase in magnitude with the size of the price change.9 Moreover, he
shows that the implications of this setting for the aggregate dynamics of inﬂation
are equivalent to those of the popular model of price rigidities developed by Calvo
(1983) and often used in the open economy literature, e.g., in Kollman (1997).
The quadratic cost is also consistent with the microeconomic evidence that some
ﬁrms change their prices by very small amounts (Rotemberg, 1996). In any case,
as stressed by Ireland (1997), this approach represents a tractable way of making
individual nominal goods prices respond only gradually to nominal disturbances,
allowing the monetary authority to aﬀect aggregate activity in the short run.
Furthermore, by having two sectors with diﬀerent price ﬂexibility, we can capture
some aspects of these ﬁndings.
The (postulated) presence of trade barriers makes it possible for ﬁrms to price-
to-market, by choosing p(h), the home-currency price they charge in the home
market, to be diﬀerent from p(f), the foreign-currency price they charge foreign
consumers. Speciﬁcally, because of the presence of a price-adjustment cost, ﬁrms
choose prices and inputs to maximize proﬁts solving the following dynamic pro-
gramming problem:
9For instance, suppose consumers have imperfect information about the distribution of prices
and that this information is costly to acquire. In such an environment, ﬁrms may prefer to make
frequent small price changes rather than sporadic large ones. On the one hand, a ﬁrm may be
unwilling to raise its price by a large amount for fear of antagonizing consumers and inducing
them to search for better price oﬀers from its competitors. On the other hand, a ﬁrm may
also be reluctant to reduce its price by a large amount in such an environment. The cost for
consumers to look for better prices gives an incentive to the ﬁrm to reduce its price by a smaller
amount than in a world of perfect information.
9J(p−1(h),p
∗





















∗(h) ≥ Y (h), (2.15)
where s ≡ (A,A
∗,g,g ∗,PD m
t−1,PD∗m
t−1) denotes the aggregate state of the world
in period t,w i t hg (g∗) denoting the domestic (foreign) growth rate of money
and PDm (PD∗m
t−1) representing the distributions of diﬀerentiated goods’ prices in
the domestic (foreign) economy. As markets are complete both domestically and
internationally, in equilibrium ∆ equals the pricing kernel for contingent claims.
2.5. The Household
Each period the household decides how much labor to supply to the monopolistic
sector, φH, and to the competitive sector, (1−φ)H, at the nominal wages W M and
W T, where 0 < φ < 1. Similarly, the household supplies a fraction, ν,o fc a p i t a l
to the monopolistic sector and a fraction, (1 − ν), to the competitive sector at
the nominal rental rates RM and RT. In addition to the factor payments, the
household’s wealth comprises nominal money balances M; contingent one-period
nominal bonds denominated in the home currency B(s) - which pay one unit
of home currency if state s occurs and 0 otherwise; proﬁts from the monopolistic
ﬁrms
R 1
0 Π(h)dh; a governmental lump-sum tax or transfer T. The household must
decide how much of its wealth to allocate to the consumption of the homogeneous
and diﬀerentiated goods and how much to invest and save in the form of bonds






















0,s) is the price of the bond contingent on the state s
0 occurring at














































10The household’s problem can be written as the following dynamic programming
problem:
























subject to (2.16), (2.17), and the law of motion for capital given by (2.9).
2.6. Government
Each period the government makes a lump-sum transfer or collects a lump-sum











where the growth rate of money g will depend on the assumed monetary reaction
function.
2.7. Equilibrium
2.7.1. Deﬁnition and Characterization
We focus on the equilibrium characterized by symmetry in the monopolistically
competitive sector, deﬁned as follows:10
• a set of decision rules for the representative household and the foreign equiv-
alent, CT(Ω;s), CM(Ω;s), B(Ω;s
0), M
0(Ω;s), h(Ω;s), I(Ω;s), K0(Ω;s),
ν(Ω;s), and φ(Ω;s), solving the household’s problem;
• a capital demand rule, K(h;p−1(h),p ∗
−1(h);s),al a b o rd e m a n dr u l e
H(h;p−1(h),p ∗
−1(h);s), and pricing functions p(h;p−1(h),p ∗
−1(h);s) and
p∗(h;p−1(h),p ∗
−1(h);s) solving the monopolistic ﬁrm’s problem;
10To save on notation, we do not show the conditions for the foreign country.
11• a capital demand rule, KT(s) and a labor demand rule HT(s) solving the











0,s),P T(s),WT(s), RT(s), WM(s),a n d
RM(s) are such that the goods, money, bonds, and input markets clear.










Because of LCP, changes in the real exchange rate come from deviations from
the LOP in monopolistic goods. Using the household’s ﬁrst order conditions, the























Therefore, the variance of the logarithm of z(s) c a nbed e c o m po s e di nt h ef o l l o w i n g
way:
Va r(logz)=( 1− γ)
2 [Va r(logq
∗)+Va r(logq) − 2Cov(logq
∗,logq)]. (2.22)
11The theoretical prediction that bilateral real exchange rates should be highly correlated
with cross-country consumption ratios is common to all equilibrium models, irrespective of the
degree of pass-through assumed. Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollman (1995) showed that
this prediction hardly ﬁnds support in the data.





the smaller the consumption share γ of the homogeneous good and the lower
the cross-country covariance of relative (log) consumption of the monopolistic
good, the more volatile z(s) is.12 Therefore, provided consumption is positively
correlated across countries as it is in the data, this model can realistically generate
a real exchange rate at most as volatile as relative consumption.13
Second, since the foreign country imports home monetary policy when it pegs
its nominal exchange rate, relative consumption becomes perfectly correlated in
response to both real and monetary shocks. As a result, the covariance between
domestic and foreign consumption increases to such an extent that the variance of
z(s) is approximately zero. Therefore, for the model to successfully replicate the
relevant stylized facts, the model’s variances of domestic and foreign consumption
of the monopolistic good should remain roughly invariant across currency regimes.
We demonstrate below that the model generates very similar consumption vari-
ances across exchange-rate regimes.
3. Calibration
In order to be able to solve the model we have to pick baseline values for the
parameters. The top panel of Table 1 reports our benchmark choices, which we
assume symmetric across the two countries. Several parameters’ values are similar
to those used in Chari et al. (2000), who calibrate their model to the United
States and Europe. In contrast, because of data availability, we will compare our
model to the G7 countries’ evidence over the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton
Woods periods.14 In Section 5, we conduct some sensitivity analysis to assess the
robustness of our results, under the benchmark calibration.






13As shown by Chari et al. (2000), when all good markets are segmented (γ =0 ) , the real
exchange rate is given by a diﬀerent expression, not involving within-country relative prices. In
this case, the real exchange-rate volatility is roughly proportional to that of relative consump-
tion across countries, with the constant of proportionality given by the relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient.
14The G7 countries are the USA, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and
Canada.
13Preferences Consider ﬁrst the preference parameters. We adopt a utility func-














































The leisure parameters ε and υ are set so as to give an elasticity of labor supply,
with marginal utility held constant, of 2 and a working time of one-quarter of the
total time. We set to curvature parameter η to 2.
Following Chari et al. (2000), we set ψ to 0.94. The interest elasticity of money
demand, σ, is known to be small but positive. We use Ireland’s (1997) estimate
and set it equal to 0.159. The relative share of the diﬀerentiated consumption
good in steady-state consumption (1 − γ) is set to 0.58, which is the average of
Rauch’s (1999) estimate for diﬀerentiated products over the last three decades.15
The discount factor β is set to 0.9901, implying a quarterly real interest rate of 1
percent.
We set θ to 6.17, yielding a value of 1.19 for the steady-state markup, equal
to that estimated by Morrison (1990); this value is standard in the literature.
The elasticity of substitution between monopolistic home and foreign goods is
1
1 − ω
; we use the estimate of Backus et al. (1995) and set it to 1.5. We set the
parameters aH and aF, in the consumption aggregator, determining the steady
state monopolistic good import share, to 0.7607 and 0.2393. This corresponds to
the parameters in Chari et al. (2000), in their high export share exercise, and is
also in line with the estimates in Kollman (1997) for the G7 countries.
Production Consider next the technology parameters for the homogeneous and
the diﬀerentiated goods. Since all the goods are traded, we used Stockman and
Tesar’s (1995) estimate of the labor share in the production of tradable goods and
set (1 − ρ) and (1 − α) to 0.61.
We set the second derivative of the capital adjustment cost function in steady
state, φ
00
(δ), so that the volatility of investment relative to that of output is in
15In Section 5.1 we analyze the implications of diﬀerent values of this parameter.
14line with the data. Following Ireland (1997), we set the parameter of the price-
adjustment cost function ξ =5 0 . Ireland shows that such a parametrization leads
ﬁrms to contemporaneously erase 10 percent of the discounted gap between their
current and expected future prices and the price that would be optimal in the
absence of adjustment costs, a value suggested by King and Watson (1996).




= λA + ²
0
where A ≡ (A,A∗)
0
, ² ≡ (²,²∗)
0
and λ is a matrix of coeﬃcients. For our bench-
mark calibration, we follow Backus et al. (1995) and use their estimates of λ for







and their values for the standard deviation and cross-correlation of the shocks
(²,²∗), equal to .00852 and 0.258, respectively.
Monetary Processes The details of the monetary rules followed in the G7
countries are extensively discussed in the literature. A recently popular way to
d os oh a sb e e nw i t ha ni n t e r e s tr a t er u l e ;t h u sw et a k ea so u rb e n c h m a r kt h e
forward-looking instrument rules for the short-term interest rates estimated for
the US and the other G7 countries by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998, 2000).
Subsequently we assess how changing this benchmark aﬀects our results.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the monetary authority sets the nominal short-
term interest rates according to the following feedback rule:
logRt =( 1− αR)logR + αR logRt−1 + απEt( d πt+1)+αyEt( d yt+1)+εt,R
where R, π,a n dy represent the short-term nominal interest rate, aggregate in-
ﬂation, and aggregate output. As usual, b x denotes the deviation of that variable
from its steady state level. Drawing from the estimates for the US in Clarida,
Galì and Gertler (2000), regarding the period 1979:3-1996:4, we set αR =0 .79,
απ =0 .4515, and αy =0 .1953.
We set the benchmark calibration of the standard deviation of εt,R to 0.005,
which is a middle ground between the estimates of Ireland (1997), McCallum and
15Nelson (1999), and those found in Angeloni and Dedola (1999). Finally, since in
the model the volatility of the real exchange rate is aﬀected by the cross-correlation
of consumption, the correlation of monetary shocks across countries is set such
that the model matches the empirical cross-correlation of consumption between
the US and the average of the other G7 countries since 1973.
4. Findings
We now assess the business cycle properties of our model economy under the two
diﬀerent exchange-rate regimes, focusing on the diﬀerence in the volatility of key
variables. Throughout all the exercises, we deﬁne the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
as the one in which the foreign country (credibly) pegs its currency to that of the
home country. We compute all the statistics by logging and ﬁltering the data using
the Hodrick and Prescott ﬁlter and averaging moments across 100 simulations,
each running for as many periods as the actual ﬁxed and ﬂoating historical periods
(i.e., 52 and 116 quarters respectively). The H-P ﬁltered statistics for the data,
the baseline economy and some variations on that economy are reported in Tables
2, 4 and 5. The statistics for the data are all computed with the United States as
the home country and the average of the other G7 countries as the foreign one.
In order to convey the extent of the puzzle highlighted by Stockman (1983),
Mussa (1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989), and Flood and Rose (1995), Ta-
ble 2 reports the standard deviations of the main macroeconomic variables and
exchange rates for the US and the (average of) other G7 countries. The Table
clearly shows that while the real and the nominal exchange rates have become
much more volatile in the post-Bretton Woods era, we do not observe a similar
change in the volatility of the other macroeconomic variables reported in the table.
For instance, the standard deviations of output are roughly the same under the
two periods for both the US and the average of the other G7 countries. Moreover,
while consumption,employment, interest rates and US investment have become
more volatile since 1973, this increased volatility pales compared to the increase
in the standard deviation of the nominal and real exchange rate. Finally, the
standard deviation of net exports (and of foreign investment) slightly fell after
the demise of Bretton Woods. Figure 1 depicts the data for individual countries,
yielding the same broad picture.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the benchmark model can match the data qualitatively
well. Comparing volatilities of variables under either a ﬁxed or a ﬂexible exchange-
rate regime, Table 2 shows that the real exchange rate is clearly the variable most
16aﬀected by a change in the currency regime: under a ﬂoat it becomes roughly three
times as volatile as foreign output. In general, as in the data, a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime brings about an increase in most variables’ volatilities, both for the
home and the foreign country, although none experiences changes in volatility as
large as that of the real exchange rate. Only the volatilities of foreign output and
employment and home investment slightly decrease.
However, quantitatively, on some dimensions the model is less successful. The
second variable most aﬀected by the exchange rate regime is net exports: its
standard deviation increases by about ﬁfty percent under the ﬂoat compared to
that when the foreign country pegs its currency. In the model, net exports are
also more volatile when the currencies ﬂoat than under the ﬁxed exchange-rate
regime, whereas the opposite occurs in the data.16
In addition, as we previously mentioned, both real and nominal exchange
rates have been highly volatile under the current ﬂexible exchange rate system.
In fact, Table 2 reports that the standard deviation of either exchange rate is
approximately 4 times that of output. Under our calibration, the model with a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime produces variability of the nominal and real exchange
rates that are, respectively, 7.7 and 3.2 times the variability of home output.
Therefore, the model succeeds in generating a volatile nominal exchange rate,
and this translates into a variability of the real exchange rate relative to aggregate
output that is only slightly smaller than that in the data. Nevertheless, this comes
at a cost. Under the postulated rule for monetary policy, the volatility of some
variables relative to that of output is not matched in the model: the money stock,
the inﬂation rate and consumption are more volatile than in the data when the
currencies ﬂoat, although their volatility is barely aﬀected by the exchange-rate
regime.
Finally, while the real and the nominal exchange rates correlation is very high
in the model — 0.82, close to that recorded in the data since 1973, equal to 0.95
— one important shortcoming is the negative cross-correlation of output, which
results, as in most business cycle models, from the transfer of productive resources
to the relatively more productive country in responses to real shocks.
16However, we will show below that the volatility of net exports increases much more dras-
tically, from a ﬁxed to a ﬂexible exchange-rate regime, when ﬁr m sd on o tp r i c et om a r k e t .I n
this sense, pricing-to-market improves the match of the model with the data.
17Table 3
Ratios of Relative Prices’ Second Moments
across Exchange Rate Regimes
St.Dev.(q∗) St.Dev.(q) Cov(q∗,q)
Fix vs. Float 1.15 1.08 1.98
The Behavior of Relative Prices across Countries Why are the variances
of most macroeconomic series in our model, except that of the real exchange rate,
unaﬀected by the exchange rate regime? One immediate reason is that the change
in the exchange rate system impinges mainly on the covariance between domestic
and foreign relative prices. Recall from Section 2.7 that we can write the variance
o ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea s :
Va r(logz)=( 1− γ)
2 [Va r(logq
∗)+Va r(logq) − 2Cov(logq
∗,logq)].
Under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, the domestic and foreign relative prices
are barely correlated in response to a monetary shock and perfectly correlated in
response to a real shock. Since the foreign country imports the home monetary
policy when it pegs its nominal exchange rate, relative prices become perfectly
correlated in response to both real and monetary shocks. Therefore, the covariance
and the correlation of relative prices increase under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
to such an extent that the variance of the real exchange rate is approximately
zero.
Table 3 presents the ratios of the standard deviation and the covariance of
domestic and foreign relative prices under the two exchange rate regimes. It shows
that while the standard deviations of the domestic and foreign relative prices are
approximately the same under the two currency regimes, the covariance between
these two relative prices is two times higher when the nominal exchange rate
is ﬁxed. Therefore, because of the link between consumption and relative prices
shown in Section 2.7, the fact that the volatility of relative prices is barely aﬀected
by the exchange-rate system explains why consumption and output are equally
volatile whether the exchange rate is ﬁxed or not.
185. Sensitivity Analysis
Here we examine the ﬁndings of our benchmark model by varying assumptions
about some of the model’s features. In particular, we study the importance of
the monetary rule and the market structure for the model’s results. We ﬁnd that
while, overall, our previous ﬁndings are fairly robust to changes in systematic
monetary policy, LCP plays a crucial role in making quantities not sensitive to
t h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e .
5.1. LCP and the Flexible Price Sector
As argued above, in our baseline calibration the volatility of the real exchange rate
does not have an impact on the volatility of quantities because of the presence
of ﬁrms pricing-to-market and because of a signiﬁcant share of the competitive
good. Basically, the combination of pricing-to-market and price rigidity in the
buyer’s currency mitigates the expenditure-switching eﬀect, since movements in
nominal exchange rates do not fully pass-through to the prices consumers face.
As a result, large variations in exchange rates are not necessarily associated with
as large movements in consumption, output, and net exports, as when ﬁrms do
net set prices in buyers’ currencies. Here, we want to shed some light on the
contribution of these two features of the model, by investigating how changes in
γ, the share of the purely competitive, ﬂexible-price good, and the absence of LCP
aﬀect our results. We report the results of these two experiments in Table 4.17
5.1.1. LCP
Removing LCP has an important impact on the relative variability of quantities
across exchange-rate regimes. Net exports are now over 4 times more volatile
when the currencies ﬂoat than under the ﬁxed exchange-rate regime. The real
exchange rate is also slightly less volatile. To better understand this result, Figure
2 compares the responses of the economies, with and without LCP, to a negative
one standard-deviation shock to the domestic nominal interest rate.
Under LCP, the drop in the interest rate implies that the domestic growth rate
of money and inﬂation rise on impact. Due to the presence of price-adjustment
costs in the monopolistic sector, this leads the relative price of foreign diﬀerenti-
ated goods in the home country to fall. As a result, home consumption of foreign
17We only report the statistics for the home country since the impact on foreign ones is very
similar.
19diﬀerentiated goods increases. Nevertheless, the fall in the price outweighs the
increase in demand and home expenditure on foreign diﬀerentiated goods falls.
Note that, because of LCP, the foreign economy is barely aﬀected by a monetary
shock in the home country.
When there is no LCP, the expenditure-switching eﬀect is magniﬁed. First,
since the exchange rate depreciated, the relative price of foreign diﬀerentiated
goods in the home country now rises. Nevertheless, home demand for these goods
rises, since the monetary shock increases total domestic aggregate demand and
this increase outweighs the negative impact of rising prices on demand. Similarly,
since the foreign currency appreciates, home diﬀerentiated goods are now cheaper
in the foreign country. As a result foreign demand for home diﬀerentiated goods
rises. When there is no LCP, the response expenditure on imports is much larger
than with LCP. As a result, the response (in absolute value) of net exports of
diﬀerentiated goods is about four times larger when ﬁrms do not set prices in
buyers’ currencies. Therefore, LCP is important for the ﬁndings.
5.1.2. Two Sectors
In this exercise we reduce the size of the tradable sector to 1 percent, by setting
γ =0 .01. Thus, the importance of nominal rigidity increases and since monetary
shocks play a signiﬁcant role in our environment, reducing the size of the compet-
itive sector can potentially aﬀect the result. However, we ﬁnd that the size of the
sectors does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁndings across regimes, while it
slightly aﬀects absolute volatilities under a ﬂoat.
5.2. Monetary Policy Rules
There is a lively debate over the most appropriate way to model monetary policy.
Here we describe the properties of our model economy under diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions of the monetary process. Speciﬁcally, we investigate how a money growth
rule, a contemporaneous interest rate rule and changes in the home country sys-
tematic monetary policy across exchange rate regimes, similar to those docu-
mented for the US, aﬀect our ﬁndings.
5.2.1. Money-Growth Rate Rule
In general, the equilibrium of the economy under the interest rate rule has a
corresponding money growth process associated with it. Assuming this money
20growth process to be the policy rule, the equilibrium for this economy with this
money growth is the same as that for an economy with the interest rate rule. Of
course, such rules can be represented as either a function of both past endogenous
variables and exogenous shocks or as a function of solely the history of exogenous
shocks. Moreover, there is empirical evidence in support of the choice for the
money growth rule. In particular, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998)
have shown that a money growth process of the kind considered here is a good
approximation to a process that implements their estimated interest rate rule.
Thus, we consider the implications of replacing our interest rate rule with a
simple rule for money growth similar to those usually studied in the monetary
business cycle literature, e.g., by Cooley and Hansen (1995) and Chari et al.
(2000). In particular, we assume that the growth rate of the money stocks for
both countries follows a process of the form:
logg
0




0 is a normally distributed, zero-mean shock. Each shock has a standard
deviation of σu, and the shocks have a positive cross-correlation. The stochastic
process for money in the foreign country is the same. Following Chari et al.
(2000), we choose ρg = 0.57. In order to make results comparable to those under
the benchmark calibration, we set the standard deviation of these shocks so that
the nominal interest rate volatility is .67, the same as under the interest rate
rule. As before, the cross-correlation of these shocks is chosen so as to produce a
cross-correlation of consumption that is equal to that in the data. In Table 5, we
report the results for this exercise in the columns labeled “Exogenous Money.”
When we use this money-growth rule in our benchmark model, we basically
obtain the same results as before. Brieﬂy, this model moves the ratio of the
volatilities of the main macroeconomic variables across regimes closer to those in
the data, including net exports. In addition, consumption volatility is now lower
than that of output. However, the model’s nominal and real exchange rates are
much less volatile than those in either the data or the benchmark model. The
reason is that the growth rate of money is now much less volatile than under the
forward-looking interest-rate rule, even though the nominal interest rate volatility
is the same by construction. This leads to less volatile relative prices, which
ultimately translate into a less volatile real exchange rate. As we will explain in
the next experiment, this is due to the systematic response to shocks entailed by
our benchmark, forward-looking rule.
215.2.2. Contemporaneous Interest-Rate Rule
In our second experiment we posit that monetary policy follows a more standard
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), according to which short-term interest rates react
to contemporaneous deviations of inﬂation and output from their target (steady
state) values. In this exercise, we keep the same parametrization of the cen-
tral bank’s reaction function as under the benchmark case, but we assume that
the monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to contem-
poraneous movements in inﬂation and output. Tables 5 reports the results for
this exercise in the columns labeled “Contemporaneous.” Again, but for the real
exchange rate, overall the exchange-rate regime does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
volatilities of the model’s variables. However, when the central bank follows a con-
temporaneous interest-rate rule, the standard deviation of the real exchange rate
relative to that of output is much lower than under the forward-looking reaction
function. Therefore, these results are similar to those under the money-growth
rule.
Whether the reaction function of the central bank is forward looking or not
therefore matters for the volatility of the real exchange rate, in our environment.
Under this rule, the central bank is assumed to react to expected deviations
of the inﬂation rate and output from their respective targets. Thus, when an
unexpected shock hits the economy, the monetary authority does not respond to
current deviations in inﬂation and output. In this environment in which some
ﬁrms enjoy price ﬂexibility while the others face price-adjustment costs, shocks
have the maximum inﬂation and output eﬀect on impact, as shown in Figure 3.
The responses to an expansionary monetary shock of domestic aggregate inﬂation,
aggregate output, relative prices, nominal interest rate, money growth and the real
exchange rate under both types of interest-rate rules are reported.18 The ﬁgure
shows that under the forward-looking rule the central bank allows the nominal
interest rate to fall more on impact, making current inﬂation and output deviate
more from their steady state values than under the contemporaneous rule. As
a result, the domestic relative price of diﬀerentiated goods falls more and the
extent of the depreciation of the real exchange rate is more pronounced under
the forward-looking rule. Since the response of output is about the same under
either rule, the real exchange rate depreciates more relative to output when the
central bank is forward looking. This diﬀerence between the rules occurs because
the inﬂation rate displays very low persistence, quickly returning to the steady
18The intuition is similar for a real shock.
22state value following a shock.
5.2.3. Diﬀerent Monetary Rule Under the Fixed Exchange-Rate Regime
Finally, there is some presumption that systematic monetary policy may have
undergone signiﬁcant changes in the last few decades. For instance, Clarida et
al. (2000) have shown that the monetary policy rule followed by the Fed have
changed in the 1980s with respect to the Bretton Woods period. The rule they
estimate over this period is rather diﬀerent from the one prevailing under Volcker
and Greenspan; they argue that it may have entailed a less eﬀective stabilization in
response to shocks hitting the economy, making macroeconomic variables unduly
volatile.
Therefore, in the following exercise we assume that, under the ﬁxed exchange-
rate regime, the domestic central bank follows a forward-looking interest-rate
rule identical to the one in the benchmark calibration, but with the following
parameters: αR =0 .87, απ =0 .1978, and αy =0 .0322. One aspect of this rule
is that the central bank is not as prone to ﬁght inﬂation by raising the nominal
interest rate. These parameters correspond to those estimated in Clarida et al.
(2000) under the Miller chairmanship in the 1960s, but for the coeﬃcient on the
lagged interest rate. Relative to their ﬁndings, we had to increase the estimate on
the lagged interest rate (0.87 relative to 0.77). Clarida et. al. (2000) and others
have argued that models with an interest-rate rule with properties such as those
in the pre-Volcker era can lead to multiple equilibria. This is indeed the case in
our environment when we use their estimated αR =0 .77. However, the model has
a unique equilibrium when we raise αR to 0.87. To concentrate on the study of
unique rational expectation equilibria, we therefore chose this parameterization.
In Table 5, we report the results for this exercise in the columns labeled “Two
rules.” Although no variable experiences a change in volatility similar to that of
the real exchange rate, in general we ﬁnd that, under the ﬂexible exchange-rate
regime and the benchmark rule, all the variables are now about 20 to 25 percent
less volatile than when the foreign currency is pegged. Therefore, we ﬁnd that
changes in systematic monetary policy across exchange-rate regimes, similar to
those recently pointed out in the literature on the stability of monetary reaction
functions, can have a quantitatively important role in bridging the gap between
the equilibrium models and the evidence across regimes.
236. Concluding Remarks
The recent literature on the volatility of the real exchange rate has suggested
that there is some hope for a “traditional” macroeconomic approach to the real
exchange rate. Following this insight, this paper has developed a somewhat stan-
dard general equilibrium model, featuring deviations from the law of one price
and nominal price rigidities. We found it quantitatively able to go some way in
accounting for both the dramatic increase in the relative volatility of the nominal
and real exchange rates since the fall of the Bretton Woods system, and the rela-
tive stability in the volatility of most other macroeconomic variables. One of the
main mechanisms behind this result is the combination of local currency pricing
and price rigidity in the buyer’s currency, as ﬂuctuations in nominal exchange
rates are not fully passed through to the prices consumers face. Consequently,
large variations in exchange rates are not necessarily associated with large move-
ments in quantities. This feature is quantitatively crucial, since it particularly
decreases the volatility of net exports, under ﬂoating exchange rates. In addition,
although we ﬁnd that a combination of LCP and price rigidity helps bridge the
gap between the model and the data, these features cannot by themselves account
for the entire extent of the puzzle once we allow monetary policy to change sig-
niﬁcantly across exchange-rate regimes in a direction that is consistent with the
recent evidence on the stability of monetary reaction functions.
Clearly, however, this analysis is not free of problems; for instance, our equi-
librium model can generate signiﬁcant real exchange rate variability only under a
forward-looking central bank, and at the cost of generating too volatile consump-
tion and inﬂation rates. Finally, in our model the increase in variability of the
real exchange rate under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime is brought about by a
fall in the covariance of within-country relative prices of goods that are subject to
price-discrimination; the currency regime has barely any eﬀect on the variance of
these relative prices. Therefore, an important task for future research would be to
provide direct evidence of the speciﬁc relationships among exchange-rate arrange-
ments, sectorial market structure, and the properties of relative price movements.
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where Ui and Vi represent the partial derivative of the utility function and the value
function with respect to their ith argument, and χ is the multiplier associated
with the capital evolution equation (2.7). S(s
0
,s) denotes the transition function
governing the state of the world. It gives the probability of state s
0 occurring at
time t +1 , given that the world is in state s at time t.
Firms Similarly to the competitive ﬁrm, the problem of the monopolistic ﬁrm
yields the following conditions:
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where ζ is the multiplier related to the distribution of output across home and
foreign markets (2.18), and ϕi is the partial derivative of the cost function with
respect to its ith argument.
Conditions (2.38) and (2.39) are the standard conditions stipulating that the
ﬁrm hires labor and capital until the marginal revenue of hiring one more unit
equals its marginal cost. Equations (2.40) and (2.41) indicate that the ﬁrm selects
prices pm
h,h(j) and pm
f,h(j) so that the marginal beneﬁto fr a i s i n gap r i c ee q u a l st h e















































































By raising its price, the monopolistic ﬁrm beneﬁts from the higher value of its
output but bears the current and future costs of changing its price, as well as a




Preferences β = .9901,η =2 ,ψ = .94,σ = .159,γ = .42,
ω =1 /3,θ =6 .17,a H =0 .7607,a F =0 .2393
Homogeneous good technology α = .39,Ψ
00
(δ)=−2.6
Diﬀerentiated good technology ρ = .39,ξ =5 0






σε = σε∗ = .00852,corr(ε,ε∗)=.258





Exogenous money ρg = .57,σu = σu∗ = .007,corr(εR,ε∗
R)=−.006









Business Cycle Statistics Across Exchange Rate Regimes
Statisticsa Datab Baseline Economy
Home Foreign Home Foreign
Floatc Ratiod Floatc Ratiod Float Ratiod Float Ratiod
Standard Deviations
Y 1.73 1.10 1.84 0.99 1.08 1.13 1.120 . 8 6
C 1.33 1.30 1.7 1.35 1.35 1.17 1.46 1.27
I 5.55 1.42 4.37 0.91 4.40 0.89 4.48 1.13
H 1.42 1.21 2.37 1.34 0.68 1.30 0.65 0.8
NX 2.65 0.87 2.43 0.89 1.10 1.58 1.10 1.58
M 1.37 0.86 3.54 0.88 11.8 1.05 17.11 .50
R 0.46 1.64 0.42 1.46 0.67 1.05 0.70 1.37
π 0.511 .38 0.74 0.98 3.16 1.07 3.33 1.14
S 5.56 4.34 4.26 2.13 8 . 3 5—8 . 3 5—
S/$ —— 7 . 5 5 3 . 3 6 ————
Z 5.15—4 . 9 8— 3 . 4 1 —3 . 4 1 —
Z/$ —— 7 . 2 6 2 . 6 5 ————
aSeries are quarterly, logged (with exception of net exports and inﬂation) and passed
through the HP ﬁlter.
bData were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics: Y is real GDP
(industrial production for France); C is nominal total private consumption
expenditures deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator (CPI for France); I is change in nominal
stocks deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator; N is industrial employment; NX is net exports
over total sum of imports and exports; π is quarterly CPI inﬂation; Z and S are real
and nominal eﬀective exchange rates computed by the IMF (REC and NEC,
respectively); e/$ and z/$ are nominal and real exchange rates vis-´ a-vis the U.S.
dollar (based on relative CPI). Home statistics refer to the US, foreign ones to
averages of the other G7 countries.
cT h eB r e t t o nW o o d sp e r i o di st a k e nt or u nf r o m1957:1 to 1972:4 (or shorter subject
to data availability); the Post-Bretton Woods from 1974:1-1997:4.
dStatistic value under a ﬂoat over value under a peg.
32Table 3
Ratios of Relative Prices’ Second Moments
Across Exchange Rate Regimes
St.Dev.(q∗) St.Dev.(q) Cov(q∗,q)
Fix vs. Float 1.15 1.08 1.98
Table 4
Sensitivity Analysis: LCP and Flexible Price Sector
Statisticsa Variations on Baseline Economy
No LCPb Low γc
Home Ratio Home Ratio
Standard Deviations
Y 1.00 0.99 1.11 1.08
C 1.19 1.03 1.311 .10
I 4.42 0.86 3.72 0.86
H 0.58 1.25 0.58 1.30
NX 3.34 4.35 0.93 1.35
M 12.4 1.02 11.6 0.98
R 0.67 1.01 0.65 1.02
π 2.94 0.98 1.19 1.03
S 8.80 6.50
Z 2.96 21.0 3.49 39.0
aAll statistics are referred to the home country.
bFirms are assumed to set export prices in the home currency.
cThe steady state consumption share of the homogeneous good is set to γ =0 .01.
33Table 5
Sensitivity Analysis: Business Cycle Statistics Across Monetary Rules
Statisticsa Variations on Baseline Economyb
Exogenous Money Contemporaneous Two Rules
Float Ratioc Float Ratioc Float Ratioc
Standard Deviations
Y 1.100 . 9 91.11 1.06 1.08 0.93
C 0.60 1.09 0.65 1.09 1.35 0.78
I 2.30 0.95 2.58 0.90 4.39 0.75
H 0.56 0.98 0.54 1.190 . 6 8 0 . 8 5
NX 0.75 1.04 0.80 1.14 1.05 0.69
M 0.54 1.04 10.5 0.99 11.9 1.73
R 0.67 1.05 0.611 .01 0.66 1.36
π 0.911 .03 1.37 1.03 3.160 . 7 7
S 2.85 — 8.67 — 8.42 —
Z 1.45 — 1. 6 7—3 . 4 3 —
aAll statistics are referred to the home country.
bSee Section 5.2 for the experiments description.
cStatistic value under a ﬂoat over value under a peg.
34Figure 1: Volatilities of Real and Nominal Variables Under and After
Bretton Woods




























































Countries are G7. Nominal and real variables are as deﬁned in Table 2.
35Figure 2. LCP Vs. No LCP
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The solide line and dotted lines represent the reponses of the variable under no
LCP and LCP, respectively, to a one-standard deviation monetary shock. The
responses denote deviations from steady state.
36Figure 3. Forward-Looking And Contemporaneous Rules















































The solide line and dotted lines represent the reponses of the variable under the
contemporaneous and forward-looking rules, respectively to a one-standard
deviation monetary shock. The responses denote deviations from steady state.
37